THE END OF "L 59"

When the return of "L 59" was reported to the Kaiser, his only response was to ask offhandedly: "Where is it to be used now. Palestine?"

Palestine was very much in the news. The British troop movements, which in October had helped furnish the cover story for "L 59", had erupted into a new assault on the Turkish lines at Gaza in southern Palestine. General Allenby, covering his preparations with elaborate deceptive measures, had outflanked the Turks and rolled up their positions. The Allied watchword "Jerusalem before Christmas!" seemed close to fulfillment. How different it had been in 1898 when the Kaiser had made his highly publicized visit of state to Jerusalem. Tne Turkish authorities had hurried to fill in the ancient moat between the Jaffa Gate and the Citadel, the Castle of David as it is often called, so that the Emperor would not have to walk through the narrow, angled Jaffa Gate but could make his entrance in style²⁸. The Kaiser had let it be known that he would enter the holy city as a "devout pilgrim"; he entered in the white uniform and the polished metal helmet of the Prussian Guards. "A brilliant achievement redounding to the honor of Christendom and of the German nation", the North German Gazette reported. "This voyage of peace has gained more for the German people than all the crusades which the old emperors led to the Holy Land" noted a biography of the Kaiser.

Tne staff persuaded His Majesty that the airship could not be used in Palestine. For the moment, however, they could not say what was to be done with it. There were no plans for "L 59". It was not supposed to return.

Soon, however, two ideas for exploiting the long distance capabilities of "L 59" were put forward. One was to try the flight to Africa once again. The other was to fly a supply mission to the Turkish troops which the Arab revolt had left stranded in Yemen. Inquiries with the Turkish authorities to find out whether they were interested in the latter undertaking were initiated at once. Bockholt pounced on these proposais. He had been deprived of the chance to complete a spectacular mission and he was eager for another opportunity. The ship and the crew had proven their ability to carry out long distance flights. There was no doubt that "L 59" could have finished the trip to East Africa with margin to spare. It still had 3317 gallons of gasoline on board when it returned to Yambol, enough to fly another 56 hours.

On the evening of the 26th, Bocknolt telegraphed the Naval Command from Yambol. He argued that the news from Africa had turned more favorable and the trip should be repeated. He could guaranty the delivery of a ten ton cargo. Was he permitted to repeat the trip or could he undertake the Yemen operation?

Tne favorable news from East Africa had evidently escaped the Naval Command. Next morning, the Chief of Staff of the Naval Command, von Knorr, reached Bockholt by telegraph.²⁹ "Mornin'" he greeted Bockholt, perhaps joshing him about his Rhineland accent. "Welcome back!" Bockholt gave Knorr details of the flight. He did not omit the small convoy he had spotted in the Karpathos Straits on the 24th. "Unfortunately had no bombs on board", he added, a silly bit of swagger as if an attack on those small steamers could have converted the flight of "L 59" into a success. Knorr wanted to know what the good news from Africa was. Bockholt repeated the newsbroadcast from Malta which had been intercepted during the last night of the flight. There was nothing favorable to the Germans in that report; it was favorable only in the inferences that Bockholt drew from it. The fighting which Radio Malta had reported had taken place in the southern part of the German held African territory. Hence, since there was no news from the northern areas held by the German troops, or at least held until recently, the situation there could not have deteriorated as much as in the south, Bockholt seems to have concluded. The reasoning might have been sound in relation to the war in Europe where deeply dug trench lines separated the combatants and demarked friendly territory from that in the hands of the foe. The inference drawn by Bockholt, however, had no logical connection with the war in Africa, fought by small, small units scattered over a vast territory. The ease with which Bockholt skipped over the flaws in his logic bespeaks his eagerness to try again.

Knorr did not demur. Could Bocknolt be ready by Sunday to repeat the trip? Yes, he answered Knorr eagerly, he could repair and test his front engine # by Friday and if it worked well, he could take off again by Sunday. He needed gasoline, a machinist, two machinist mates and a good elevator helmsman. All should be good, stout volunteers. Bockholt asked for more men than he needed but there was so much malaria about that he wanted a small reserve in case one Of his men were stricken with the disease. Knorr told Bockholt to be ready by Sunday. The Naval Attache in Sofia went scurrying around to look for 3,700 gallons of gasoline. Bockholt ordered the ship to be gotten ready for another Africa flight.

Bockholt's request for extra personnel proved to be prudent. Three days later, two machinist mates, besides Busch, and four men of the maintenance crew became sick, one man was under arrest and another had to be sent home because of embezzelement. Strasser could spare Bockholt only the most badly needed men. a machinist and an elevator helisman.

In the formal report presented to the Emperor on the 29th, the Colonial Office stated that in the northeastern part of the Makonde Plateau and in the area west of Livale, strong units of the Protectorate troops were still holding out. Its reasoning seems to have paralleled that of Bockholt. If the Colonial Office, which knew the conditions prevailing in Africa better than Bockholt, was willing to share his ideas, it seems clear that the Colonial Office too had lost touch with reality. The view that the area northeast of Livale must be in German hands because the British had reported no fighting there, and that therefore the Livale area was a Suitable landing place, was a point of view which Major Göring had maintained since the beginning of the operation. He continued to adhere to it even though German resistance throughout colony was collapsing and though there was no indication of any kind that there were German troops in the vicinity. Since it would take until the 30th to outfit "L 59" anew, the Colonial Office recommended to the Emperor that consideration of the feasibility of the flight should be taken up again at that time.

In fact, the Colonial Office was fantasizing! The German force which had been deployed to the northwest of Livale, Captain Tafel's detachment, had been driven far to the south. Out of food and unable to break through to Lettow-Vorbeck, it had surrendered on the 27th. The northeastern part of the Makonde Plateau was firmly in British hands. Wishful thinking and tenuous surmise, however, seemed to rule the day and and provide the rationale for a new "China" operation.

Commander Strasser at once objected. The enemy must now know the purpose of the Africa flight and the ship was likely to become an enemy trophy if it repeated the attempt. A 2,300 mile trip across the Arabian desert to Yemen was too much and the ship was likely to be smashed trying to land in the desert heat. Strasser wanted the ship to be rebuilt as a seven engined, fast reconnaissance craft for use over the North Sea though earlier he had not liked this idea.

Soon, the excitement over another Africa trip and the Yemen venture evaporated. The Naval Command suggested an alternative - searching for the mine fields with which the Russians blocked the Black Sea approaches to Constantinople. Strasser opposed this project also and Bockholt agreed with him. Mine searches were possible only for short periods of time when light condtions were favorable, when the sun stood high. A trial flight on December 2nd, on which he had tried mine searching off Varna, had proven that to him. Besides, frequent mine searches were not feasible because the hydrogen supply at Yambol was not reliable, confirming another reason upon which Strasser had opposed further operations by "L 59" from Yambol. The mine searching idea was dropped also.

On December 1st, the Naval Command seemed to have made up its mind that no further airship operations were to be undertaken in the Balkans. "L 59" was to return to Germany and be detailed to fleet operations. Strasser at once assumed control over "L 59" again and advised Bockholt and Mangelsdorf, the ground crew commander, that he would instruct then when they were to return.

Bockholt now developed his own plans. Stimulated by a request by the Mediterranean Division that "L 59" be used he submitted a memorandum to the Naval Command. He suggested that "L 59" be used as a long range bomber in the Mediterranean. Numerous inviting targets were strewn over a wide sector spanning from Italy to Egypt to Palestine, reaching out as far as the Aswan dam, far south in the Nile valley. The enemy would be forced to deploy large forces to defend these targets once a threat to them had been made real. The ability to strike at far distant targets would boost the prestige of the zeppelins and help morale. Trade, particularly through Port Said and Alexandria, would be disturbed and the attacks would have a great political impact. "The appearance of a bomb dropping airship over Cairo or Aswan would consitute proof for the inhabitants of North Africa of Germany's greatness and might".

With Bockholt's memorandum, the decision of the Naval Command to return "L 59" to the North Sea came undone again. The ship remained in Yambol while the Naval Command pondered the new proposal. It could come to no conclusion. Still undecided, it ordered the zeppelin to return to Germany. On the morning of December 11th, it took off for Jüterbog. At precisely noon of that day, General Allenby, with well calculated simplicity, strode through the Jaffa Gate into Jerusalem. He entered that venerable city at the same spot at which the Kaiser had entered nineteen years earlier.

Upon returning to Germany, those of the crew who did not yet wear the decoration were awarded the Iron Cross, Second Class - Grussendorf, Holland, Heiman, Bröcker, Proll, Schmitz, Hocke, Fuchs, Schedelman and Kettner. There was no recognition for the efforts of those who already had been awarded the black and silver Maltese Cross shaped decoration. Nor was there any medal for Bockholt. He already had his "EK II". The Naval Cabinet decided against recommending Bockholt for the Order of the House of Hohenzoller, the decoration which would have customarily been awarded in the circumstances. "L 59" had not attained its military goals and this could be ascribed in part to the loss of "L 57". Bockholt could have avoided its loss if he had evaluated the weather report more carefully on that fateful day in Jüterbog. An Imperial Commenddation would do.

Reminded that he had not yet made a decision concerning the report about the loss of "L 57", the Chief of Staff of the Naval Command issued an order on December 17th determining that Bockholt had not peen guilty of any "vertretbare Schuld" in that connection, echoing Strasser's peculiar phrase. The way was now clear for Bockholt's Commendation. A perfunctory one was issued at last on December 29th. It wound its ponderous way through channels, from the Naval Cabinet to the Chief of the Naval Command and from him to the Chief of Airships who in turn forwarded it to Bockholt.

At the request of the Naval Command, Bockholt now wrote a more elaborate version of his December 4th memorandum for presentation at the Kaiser's headquarters. He sent it off from his billet near Jüterbog on December 16th.

Strasser may have had some notion what was afoot then. On the 18th he sent an order to Bocknolt that henceforth all applications and reports were to be directed to him. He referred to the decision of the Naval Command of December 1st releasing "L 59" for duty with the fleet and informed Bockholt that by virtue of that decision the direct subordination of "L 59" to the Naval Command had ceased and had reverted to him. However, Bockholt had escaped his grasp already.

The memorandum py Bockholt, which Strasser had failed to stop, repeated his arguments concerning the use of "L 59" as a long distance bomber. Once more he included the Nile dam at Aswan among the long list of targets he had drawn up. A dam to control irrigation in the lower Nile valley had been built across the river at Aswan in 1902. Breaching the dam would no doubt have been a spectacular feat but Bockholt seems to have given no consideration to the political effect such a disaster might have on the Egyptians who so far had shown little sympathy to the cause of their British occupiers. Nor had he considered the practical difficulties of successfully breaching such a large, solid structure.

The original memorandum on the proposed use of "L 59", which Bockholt had written on December 4th, had not reached Strasser until the 11th. Strasser had not answered it, perhaps feeling with the ship returning to Germany that day, events had overtaken these ambitious plans. Now, apparently annoyed that the project to employ the Africa ship in the Mediterranean was being revived without prior consultation with him, Straser sent a telegraphed the Naval Command that he opposed the proposed use of the ship.

Strasser wrote out his report by hand the next day and sent it off by special messenger. Again, he strongly opposed Bockholt's recommendations. He was now short of ships and he could not spare a valuable ship like "L 59". As a bomber, the airship was a weapon of opportunity, Strasser argued. Used in the right circumstances, it could render valuable services but exceptional operations like the "China Affair" were not the gauge for the normal use of an airship. It was not possible to fly extended missions on a regular basis and Yambol was not capable of supporting such operations. Bockholt had not even mentioned that question although he had direct experience with the limitations of the Yambol base. "Airship operations", Strasser continued, "have never been worthwhile and never will be except in the North Sea, scouting for the fleet, and in air raids on England". The trouble with Bockholt was that he got carried away by the Africa flight. It was "aeronautically a great risk which could be taken only because of the great importance of the mission. The return of the ship must be attributed to extraordinary circumstances... Bockholt is a fine airship commander and an aggressive officer [but] he has not enough experience with the capablities of airships" Strasser concluded. Bockholt, after all, had never flown a bombing attack. "Bockholt's recommendations are heading for failure while using large resources and manpower".

Between the 19th and the 21st, the Naval Command belatedly made up its mind. Bockholt would have his bomber. It ordered Mangelsdorf to remain in Yambol. The news reached the base too late. Lt. Commander Mangelsdorf and his men had already left. Mangelsdorf did not learn of the order until he reached his home station Ahlhorn. his men, who were following him, were turned around en route and returned to Yambol, not doubt uttering the same observations about the abilities of higher commanders that soldiers have made since Moses appointed "captains over the hundreds and captains over the thousands" at Kadesh-barnea. Ludendorff took the opportunity to personally write to the Naval Command that the 56 army men still operating the hydrogen generating plant at Yambol would be withdrawn. It was indeed a rare occurence that the First Quartermaster General concerned himself personally with the fate of some fifty enlisted men.

"7, 59" was flown to the Zeppelin factory at Friedrichshafen to be refitted as a bomber. On January 5, 1918, operations orders were issued to Bockholt. He was to report to the Naval Command directly. Once more, Strasser, the Chief of Airships, was excluded from decisions concerning Bockholt was granted complete freedom of action. He was free to select his targets as weather conditions allowed. With the exception of the Aswan dam, the target list was the one that Bockholt had submitted to the Naval Command. Port Said, at the northern end of the Suez Canal was assigned first priority. It was followed, in decreasing order of importance, by Alexandria in the Nile delta, an important British naval base, Malta - the naval base athwart the narrow straits between Sicily and Africa - and the harbor of Naples. A number of additional targets in Italy, Lybia and elsewhere in the Mediterranean rounded out the list.

Work at Friedrichshafen proceeded slowly and the refitting of "L 59" was not completed until almost the middle of February. As soon as the inclement winter weather permitted, on the 14th, Bockholt started for Yambol. Within three hours, the ship returned and signaled for a landing crew. Over Kempten, 40 miles to the east, "7, 59" had run into a dense fog and, as if to recall the night over Jebl El 'Ain, had torn off its radio antenna.

The airport commander assured Bockholt that it was a minor matter, a new antenna could be installed in an hour. He omitted any gerevenes to the spare antenna which the ship carried for just such this contingency. Bockholt would have none of this. Suddenly turned cautious, he ordered the surprised commander to have "L 59" hangared. Bockholt insisted he must first talk to Munich about the weather before he did anything further.

The Ministry of the Navy telephoned the news to the Naval Command, adding "There were no technical reasons for the return and the failure to start again". The petulant tone of the message cannot be missed.

"L 59" arrived back in Yambol on February 21, 1918. Three of the Africa hands were no longer among the crew. Busch was sick; Schedelman had had nor real place in the crew and Bockholt had tried to get rid of Kettner even before he left for Africa. First Signal Mate Karl Savoye, an elevator helmsman, and radio operator Wilhelm Müller of the original crew had returned to the ship. Hans Marholz had replaced Busch as Machinist, Conradt was added to the engine crew and Heinrich Boldt came on board as a second radio operator.

Engine overhauls and bad weather kept "L 59" on the ground until March 3rd. Then it started off on a bombing raid on Naples. The first part of the trip took it across the snow covered Albanian mountains, a stretch of the trip which Bockholt enjoyed very much. He called it "very pretty", the only time such an adjective crept into his reports. A radiator froze up but was thawed out as the ship waited over Scutari for night to fall. As "L 59" moved out over the Adriatic coast, it began to run into 45 m.p.h. headwinds. There was no chance of completing the attack in this wind and over Hvar Island, Bockholt turned back to Yambol. The wind relentlessly drove "L 59" northeastward. Bockholt lost his bearings in the darkness and did not recover them until he was over Belgrade, about 200 miles off course. Once more he turned toward Yambol but when he reached the field on the noon of the next day, he had to ride out another storm for six hours before he could land. Bockholt sent an apologetic message to Berlin.

"You have freedom of action. Don't overdo things" the telegraph ticked reassuringly in reply.

Bad weather kept the ship grounded for the next six days. The inactivity depressed the crew as did the bad food. Rations were too small and the food was poor and monotonous —- rice and beans and tougn, canned meat one day after another. The Bulgarians, who issued the rations to Yambol, refused to increase the food allowance; they treated one rear echelon unit like any other. The German Naval Attache in Sofia had already tried to secure better rations for the German aviation units in Bulgaria, without success, and he was obliged to point out to Berlin that the food situation in Bulgaria was not good. The men in Yambol tried to supplement their diet Out of their own meager pay, but to no great avail.

On March 10th, "L 59" took off for another attempt to bomp Naples. Two men reported ill and weak from hunger but took their stations. Eight potbellied bombs, five feet tall, each weighing 660 pounds and forty 220 pound bombs hung in the keel. Flying west, the ship reached Scutari on the Albanian coast and cruised there for five hours to await darkness. When the sun set, it flew across the Adriatic and the Italian penninsula to its target. "L 59" approached Naples at 12,000 feet, high enough to be safe from aircraft 'attack. The hum of the engines was hardly audible on the ground.

Years of inactivity had dulled the vigilance of those charged with the city's air defenses. The city was brilliantly lit. The sky was clear and the stars shone brightly."The city slept, unaware of the impending disaster...It seemed that the hours dedicated to rest and passion would pass without disturbance".

The targets which Bockholt had selected clustered around the ancient Castle Nuovo at the harbor's edge. There lay the navy arsenal, the military and the mercantile port and the jong mole jutting into the sea, protecting the harbor. The choice of the targets had apparently been inspired by a letter which a "Mr. Weber had sent to the navy in 1916, giving it the benefit of what he had learned while living in this beautiful city for thirty years.

The bomb doors dropped open. Ensign Maas stood in the front of the command car, next to che man handling the rudder. His eye was pressed against the rubser eye piece of the Zeitz bomb sight. He watched the dense pattern of the city streets slide under his sights. At 12:55, as his targets neared the crosshairs of his telescope, he reached for the the bomb release switches to his right and began to flip them over. The bombs plummeted from the ship towards the targets below. About eight seconds later, the mushrooms began to march across the city - across the Corso Vittorio Emanuel, Via Santa Apparente, the Via Corso di Nola, Via Roma, the Via Municipo - a good bomb pattern, west to east, straight towards the intended targets.

Bockholt saw explosions, a fire broke out and sections of the town and its surroundings blacked out. He concluded that he had hit a power station. As a result, of the blackout, however, one of his primary targets, the Armstrong Works, manufacturing naval guns and shells, disappeared in the darkness. Nevertheless, Bockholt was satisfied with his work. He had caught the enemy by surprise and had dropped 10,500 pounds of bombs on his target unhindered. Now he steered for the blast furnace of the Stabilimento Ilva, just east of the village of Bagnoli, about 4-1/2 miles away. Herr Weber had reported that artillery shells were being made there. 3,500 pounds of bombs were dropped on this target. At 1:18 a.m., the last bomb was gone and "L 59" turned home. Relieved of its bomb load, it had climbed to 15,000 feet.

At the sound of the first explosions, the people of Naples ran curiously to whatever observation point lay near - the streets, windows, balconies. Curiosity quickly turned into terror as the bombs crashed into heavily populated areas of the city. When the resulting fires were extinguished and the rubble cleared away, sixteen dead were found, seven of them old retirees in the Hospice of the Sisters of the Poor. Fifty had been injured. The bomb pattern stopped just west of the Castel Nuovo, 500 yards short of the harbor's edge. Maas' aim had been good but the altitude from which the ship had attacked was too great to permit real bombing accuracy.

The attack on Naples created a sensation. A separate report was sent to the Kaiser. The Naval Command issued a special bulletin, announcing that " aerial forces" had attacked Naples with good results. There was no point in disabusing the Italians of the notion, which they entertained for several days, that they had been attacked by airplanes. The Italian Minister of War relieved the commanders of the anti-aircraft defenses of Naples, Foggia and Termoli of their command. A few days later, the Austrians handed the German Naval Attache in Vienna a fat target folder on Bologna, complete with maps and photographs, and offered any other assistance that might be needed. "I have the impression" the Naval Attache wrote to Berlin " that some here feel neglected because we did not use the assistance of the Austrian authorities in our airship attack on Naples and they now feel a need to make their oxzistence known again".

The victims of Naples were given a great public funeral. The mayor demanded of the grieving crowd "an indestructible tenacity to resist until victory, until the liberation of the fatherland!" Indignation and demands for retaliation were widespread. In fact, retaliation by both sides was well under way. On the 9th, French planes had attacked Mayence and the Gothas had dropped bombs on Paris. The German planes struck Paris again, on the 12th, leaving 29 dead and fifty injured. During the same night, English planes attacked Coblenz on the Rhine in the ever-widening air war.

Italian reports of civilian losses quickly reached Berlin through Switzerland. It probingly mentioned them to Bockholt on the telegraph. Bockholt swore that he had struck far worse blows than the Italians had admitted. "If I should ever marry, I probably won't be able to take a honeymoon trip to Naples," the nemesis of Naples bragged. It was the first victory in the campaign he had devised. He did not yet know something which other commanders had come to suspect - target observation from great altitude at night is extremely unreliable. As if to put the seal of authenticity on his accomplishment, Bockholt recommended that Maas and Machinist Marholz be decorated with the Iron Cross First Class.

The attack on Naples had been marred by one incident. The crew of the rear engine gondola had been found overcome by gasoline vapors. They had lain unconscious for two hours but the quick action of Marholz, who had found them, had saved them. Machinist mates on "L 53" had not been so lucky. Two had died this way several days earlier. The accumulation of such vapors was also highly dangerous to the ship; a spark from the machinery or static electricity could have instantaneously transformed the ship into a giant torch.

Berlin soon seems to have had second thoughts about the attack on Naples. In October and November of the previous year, German and Austrian troops had inflicted an immense defeat upon the Italians at Caporetto. Only Ludendorff's failure to commit sufficient reserves to what he considered a secondary theater of war had saved the Italians from being knocked out of the conflict. Why strengthen the enemy's will to resist with attacks on his civilian population. On March 16th, the Naval Command told Bockholt not to attack Italy for the time being.

On the 20th, "L 59" was ready to strike again. This time the target was Port Said in the Nile delta. Again the ship carried seven tons of bombs. Since there was no longer any need to hug the dense, lower airlayers as there had been on the flight to Africa, the dirigible crossed the Turkish mountains directly at a safe altitude. It left land behind at Adelia, 400 miles north of its target, and reached the Nile delta in the early morning of the 21st. When it arrived, it found that rain and clouds shrouding the African coast. "L 59" spent three hours searching for Port Said and Alexandria and finally found a lit up target below. As the ship was about to begin its bombing run, the target was recognized. It was Damietta, once a harbor of some importance but now blocked by sandbars to all but the smallest ships, a village of about 20,000 inhabitants. it was indeed a "politically unsuitable" target as Bockholt reported upon his return. "L 59" turned east hoping to find Port Said and the Suez Canal. The city was blacked out and in the darkeness, the ship overshot its goal. It had to turn into a stiff wind to regain its target.Port Said was reached just as the sun rose. A daylight attack could not be risked since resistance from' aviation or warships had to be expected and at 4:40 the attack was abandoned. It was just as well; the ship had been spotted from the ground. What action the surprised British aviators might have improvised one cannot say. Climbing to the altitude of the zeppelin would have taken some time and they had no incendiary ammunition. It is safe to say, however, that, given a chance, the British airmen would have "had a go at it". To the armchair warriors in Germany it looked different. "Too bad, should have tried it anyway" one of them wrote into the margin of Bockholt's report.

"L 59" steered for its alternate objective, the British base at Suda Bay on the northwest shore of Crete. As the ship reached the bay, it was swallowed up by snow clouds and lost sight of the ground. Strong winds tossed the zeppelin about. Since Bockholt was running low on gasoline, he decided to abandon this attack also and turn northward for home. But the gods of frustration had not yet tired of their game. A strong gust broke one of the longitudenal girders in the hull, the ship lost bearings and the wind became so strong ever the Aegean that for an hour "L 59" made no headway at all, pitching up and down through a range of thirty degrees.

Over Saros Bay, north of the Gallipoli peninsula, "L 59" regained its bearings and headed for Adrianople. There, Turkish anit-aircraft guns fired on the unlucky craft for ten minutes despite the recognition signals it flashed. And, as if to complete the picture of a flight on which nothing went right, a 220 pound bomb dropped accidentally a few miles beyond Adrianople. Fortunately, it was not fused.

At 7:15 a.m. of March 22, after almost 59-1/2 hours, "L 59" landed at Yambol again, defeated by poor weather forecasting and bad luck.

Bockholt was not discouraged. He would try Port Said again, he told the Naval Command. If necessary, he would "hide out in the desert" and approach the city at night from the southeast. For the moment, however, a major engine overhaul and the approaching full moon required that this project be put off until the end of the month.

Meanwhile, Bockholt faced another dilemna. Next to Port Said and Alexandria, Malta had highest priority among the targets assigned to him. However, because fickle spring weather or enemy action might make it impossible at the last minute to complete the attack, it made no sense to try to bomb Malta unless there were alternate targets available in southern Italy. Without such alternate targets, the whole attempt upon Malta might then go for nothing. On the 26th, Bockholt therefore asked for permission to attack the Italian naval base at Taranto despite orders issued after the Naples attack. He also asked brought up the Aswan dam again. te vaceived no arseor to his inquiry and by the 30th, Bockholt a village of about 20,000 inhabitants. It was indeed a "politically unsuitable" target as Bockholt reported upon his return. "L 59" turned east hoping to find Port Said and the Suez Canal. The city was blacked out and in the darkeness, the ship overshot its goal. It had to turn into a stiff wind to regain its target. Port Said was reached just as the sun rose. A daylight attack could not be risked since resistance from aviation or warships had to be expected and at 4:40 the attack was abandoned. It was just as well; the ship had been spotted from the ground. What action the surprised British aviators might have improvised one cannot say. Climbing to the altitude of the zeppelin would have taken some time and they had no incendiary ammunition. It is safe to say, however, that, given a chance, the British airmen would have "had a go at it". To the armchair warriors in Germany it looked different. "Too bad, should have tried it anyway" one of them wrote into the margin of Bockholt's report.

"L 59" steered for its alternate objective, the British base at Suda Bay on the northwest shore of Crete. As the ship reached the bay, it was swallowed up by snow clouds and lost sight of the ground. Strong winds tossed the zeppelin about. Since Bockholt was running low on gasoline, he decided to abandon this attack also and turn northward for home. But the gods of frustration had not yet tired of their game. A strong gust broke one of the longitudenal girders in the hull, the ship lost bearings and the wind became so strong Over the Aegean that for an hour "L 59" made no headway at again telegraphed for leave to bomb Taranto or Brindisi.

While waiting for the weather to break, a young machinist mate from Hamburg, Albert Rieck, joined the crew to replace Conradt and "veteran" Seaman First Class Adolf Fuchs celebrated his 24th birthday. Bockholt received permission to purchase additional food for the base and the mess improved.

On April 3rd, the Naval Command approved the attacks on Taranto and Brindisi. The were legitimate military targets - major naval bases. Now Bockholt was free to make his attempt on Malta. So far, in six weeks of operations, he had flown one successful mission but he had little else to show for the ship and the over four hundred men that the Naval Command had put in his hands. In France, Ludendorff had launched his long prepared, grand offensive that was to end the war. He had attacked in the St. Quentin sector to breach the Allied line and press the British back against the Channel coast. He had won a great amount of ground but so far, the enemy line had held and no decision had been gained. It was a time for action.

On the 6th, Bockholt was ready to mount his attack on Malta. He called in his meteorologist, Goebel, to obtain the latest weather reports. Goebel advised against the attack. There was a possibility of thunderstorms over the Adriatic; the base radio was picking up much static which confirmed the presence of electrical disturbances. Standing instructions to airships were to avoid flying in thunderstorms. Only six days earlier, "SL 9" had blown up in a thunderstorm, underscoring the importance of these orders. Bocknolt was torn between prudence and his urge to act. Finally, he ordered a take off for early next morning.

On April 7, 1918, "L 59" headed for Malta. The plan was to fly east to the Adriatic, turn south, pass the Straits of Otronto, seperating the Italian boot from the Albanian coast, and proceed along the Italian and Sicilian coasts southwest to Malta. Bockholt flew to Lake Skandorsko near the Adriatic coast. Over this easily identifiable checkpoint, well outside the sight of any ship passing along the Adriatic shore, Bockholt again waited for the night which was to shroud his moves into the enemy regions. At about 7 p.m., Bockholt moved on. At 7:30, he passed the lookout post at Duleigno (Ulcini) near the Albanian border and flashed his recognition signal. About an hour later, he was off the lighthouse of Cape Rodoni. Bockholt now left the Austrian occupied shore of the Adriatic behind and entered hostile areas. The shores on either side of him were now in Allied hands. To the southwest lay Brindisi, flanked by several destroyer and seaplane stations, there was another Allied base on the opposite, Albanian shore. A net and mine barrier sitaubesker' across the mouth of the Adriatic, the Straits of Otronto, starting south of Brindisi and stretching to the island of Corfu, off the Albanian shore. Intended to keep German and Austrian submarines bottled up in the Adriatic. it was guarded by numerous naval units, including 36 American submarine chasers. Throughout the area were scattered many radio location stations, at Corfu, Santa Teresa, Otronto, Palascia, Contorne and Ginosa, to name the nearest points, ready to intercept any German or Austrian radio signal and by triangulation determine the location of the ship or aircraft that had sent it.

It was a heavily overcast, humid night. Occasional rain squalls broke on the ship. A haze overlay the phosphorescent waves. A lookout was kept for the Allied ships patrolling the mouth of the Otronto Straits but a submarine passed on the surface almost directly below without being spotted. Lightning played through the sky. Strong static crackled in the ship's radio, audible evidence of the electrical discharges coursing through the air. By 9:30 p.m., "L 59" reached a position 41°2' north by 18°53' east, north of the Otronto Straits. Suddenly, Bockholt heard two explosions. The night around him brightened. The ship had caught fire. Bockholt - all the crew knew what this meant. They had been riding a gigantic Roman candle through the skies and now fate had lit its fuse. Several more explosions followed.

The awesome scene was witnessed by the crew of the German submarine "UB 53". This was the submarine over which "L 59" had blindly passed a little earlier. At 8 o'clock, its deck watch had observed a large airship coming up from astern. The submarine commander, Lieutenant Sprenger, had thought that it might be an Italian semi-rigid airship on patrol. The Italians made active use of these airships for naval patrols and had put no less than 49 in service ducing the war. Sprenger had ordered his boat cleared for action. However, he had been doubtful of his identification and had held his fire. The ship had passed over at 650 feet. Sprenger wondered whether the airship realized how easily visible it was from below. " A rifle shot would have been a certain hit" he said later. Sprenger saw that the airship was German but as a matter of caution refrained from giving a recognition signal. The airship had disappeared into the night like a ghostly apparition.

Ninety minutes later, Sprenger saw two bursts of fire in the night sky. He took them to be shrapnel bursts. Shortly afterwards, a huge flame turned the horizon into day, there were more explosions and a fiery mass fell into the water. It burned for twenty minutes.

Watchers on the Italian and Albania coasts also saw the terrible sight. A French ship of the Otronto patrol spotted the glare in the northern sky and took its bearings. "UB 53" steered toward the spot where it had seen the blaze to search for survivors. It found none. Two Austrian destroyers went to investigate and found neither survivors nor wreckage. An Austrian seaplane, joining the search, crashed.

The sightings of the midair explosion were at once reported to Berlin and the failure of "L 59" to return to its base quickly led to the conclusion that the ill fated ship had at last met its end. None of the Allies claimed to have destroyed an airship and the Germans therefore decided that the ship had fallen victim to an accident despite Lt. Sprenger's pelief that he had observed shrapnel bursts. What the cause of the accident was, nobody could say. Lightening striking the ship certainly was a possibility. Italian guards and one of the Austrian destroyers had seen a lightening storm in the area.³⁰ Perhaps faulty gasoline lines or a defective engine had permitted gasoline vapors to accumulate in the ship as they had in the Naples attack. Lehmann speculated that mishandling of a bombfuse might have caused the accident. German airship crews did not mount fuses on their bombs until the ship had left friendly territory behind, but "L 59" had already crossed the Albanian coast more than two hours earlier.

Later, recalling his stand against sending "L 59" back to Yambol, Strasser wrote what may serve as an epitaph for the men of "L 59": "I had the feeling that I had given up a capable crew with the certainty of an early loss for a useless purpose".