THE CHINA AFFAIR

Repulsed by the army, the Colonial Office once more turned to the Ministry of the Navy (Reichsmarineamt). It was now the end of July. The Colonial Office's plan arrived at the Ministry at a fortunate conjunction of events - an idea presented just as the proof of its feasibility was being delivered and at a time when interest in it had revived.

Ensign Ernst A. Lehmann was at that moment aloft in "LZ 120" on an experimental flight intended to test the ability of airships to make flights of long duration.

The 24 year old Lehmann had been captain of the civilian airship "Sachsen" which the German government had requisitioned when war began. An ensign in the naval reserves, Lehmann put on his blue uniform and began to train army airship crews on the "Sachsen". Before long, he was put in command of army airship "Z XII" and assigned to the eastern front. His reconnaissance work was highly esteemed, so much so that the headquarters staff in Poland was at times treated to the unusual spectacle of a young naval ensign bending over operational maps in earnest conference with the forbidding Chief of Staff of the German troops in the east, General Ludendorff himself. Lehmann then commanded two other ships on the western front and in 1917, received the command of the army's newest and last airship, "LZ 120", a six engined mammoth armed with ten machine guns.

Soon after, when the army began to break up its airship service, "LZ 120" was transferred to the navy and stationed at the Baltic airship base at Seerappen, near Königsberg. The assignment offered Lehmann little challenge. The Baltic front was quiet. The disasterous course which the war had taken for Russia had stirred up bloody strikes in St. Petersburg and in March these had mushroomed into the overthrow of the Tsar. Russia's military resistance was collapsing and patrolling the Baltic became a bore. "Nothing suspicious in sight" was the recurrent entry in the log of "LZ 120". In October, the naval airships were withdrawn from the Baltic altogether.

A fortuitous conversation in the officers' mess one evening steered Lehmann in a new direction. Could airships be used more efficiently by sending them aloft on long-extended patrol flights, say a hundred hours, rather than several shorter flights of equal duration? Could snip and crew withstand the strain?

Lehmann decided to put these questions to the test. He carefully organized a flight. Extra fuel tanks were installed in "LZ 120" and 37,265 pounds of gasoline and oil were put on board. Lehmann calculated that this would be enough for a 100 hour cruise. The crew of 29 men included six officers so that two officers could be on duty during each of the three watches. Special care was taken to ensure the comfort of the crew. Three double boilers, heated by the exhaust gases of one of the engines, were installed to provide them with a hot noon meal. There was plenty of drinking water and the officers even enjoyed the luxury of a shower bath, an improvised tipping bucket arrangement rigged up in the nose of the hull. July 26, 1917 was a clear night. At 11:00 p.m., "LZ 120" took off. It offered the farmers living on the hills surrounding the base the unique spectacle of an airship fly past, rather than over their houses. The ship was fully laden and Lehmann was loath to sacrifice any of his water ballast, intended to last him for a four day triv, to lighten the ship at take off. Instead, he had counted on the ship's dynamic lift to get it off the ground.¹³ Although all six engines were racing at top speed, "LZ 120" was slow to develop dynamic lift and the thundering giant stormed over the hills only a few yards above the ground. Gradually it rose and once clear, Lehmann took it over the Baltic. The night brought numerous thunderstorms and as the temperature dropped towards morning, the crew became acutely uncomfortable. Once the storm subsided, however, the trip became uneventful. The ship zig-zagged over the Baltic, generally operating on three engines. These gave little trouble except No. 2 engine which, despite mid-air repairs, ran irregularly. There was occasional bombing practice in which floating logs served as targets; the ship had taken along 2,650 pounds of bombs. There also was time for some unaccustomed midair sunbathing. The best place for this was the rear machine gun position, cut into the hull behind the upper airship rudder. It was sheltered from the ship's airflow and far away from the droning engines. Food turned out to be the only troublesome part of the trip. Bad sausages and stale bread caused widespread indigestion.

When the weather began to worsen, Lehmann decided to return. At 4:40 in the morning of the 31st, "LZ 120" came down at Seerappen again. It had been aloft for almost 102 hours and covered a distance of about 2,000 miles. It still had enough gasoline in its tanks to fly another 33 hours. The men were in excellent condition and judged able to continue the flight another 100 hours. "LZ 120" had been in the air about as long as it had been calculated it would take an airship to reach East Africa.

There also was a more receptive mood which at the Ministry of the Navy now. The morale of the sailors was low and something had to be done to boost it. The fleet had been idle since the battle of Jutland and the sailors weren restless. During May there had been mutinies on four battleships. The ground crew at the Ahlhorn airship base had come close to rebellion and only resolute action by their commander, Lt. Commander Mangelsdorff, had prevented an open outbreak. Even the elite airship crews were dejected. They had suffered heavy losses in men and ships. Of the sixty airships which had been built for the navy until then, 37 had been lost, 26 through enemy action. Losses were accelerating; twenty ships had gone down in the last year alone. Doubts began to gnaw at the souls of the men, doubts that the military results they were achieving justified the constant danger which they faced. The flight to Africa, if it were possible, would provide a much needed boost to morale. It would bestow new laurels upon the navy and raise the prestige of Germany.

The initial evaluation of the ministry was cautious but not negative. At first blush, the attempt appeared "fantastic and unreal", the Chief of the Airship Branch of the Department for Aeronautics wrote. Then he crossed out the word "unreal" and wrote over it "adventurous", fearing that perhaps that he might be guilty of unprofessional exaggeration. Possibly there were things which might make the flight feasible. He adopted two of Zupitza's suggestions: an interim stop in Syria and taking advantage of nortnowinds which tended to predominate during the winter months. Tradewindlike currents at higher altitudes might help during the second part of the trip (To be checked!" he added), To caution his readers against rejecting out of hand the notion of flying to Bast Africa, he reminded how the seamen of medieval times had been warned against undertaking their great voyages of discovery because they would become hopelessly entangled in the weeds of the Sargasso Sea and would never be able to climb back to the northern hemisphere once they had descended to the equator and had dropped below it into the southern hemisphere. He recommended that the Colonial Office be allowed two hours to make a presentation of the project to the Ministry of the Navy. "If there is ais some possibility of success, perhaps the attempt is worth it", the memorandum concluded.

The Colonial Office made its presentation and with the favorable attitude which the Chief of the Airship Branch had displayed, it was not surprising that the Colonial Office was able to carry the day.

Working out a concrete plan for the flight presented a number of serious problems. It was clear that the Africa flight represented a quantum jump beyond the "LZ 120" experiment. The starting point for the expedition would have to be Yambol. It was the southernmost German airship base and was located in the central part of Bulgaria, an ally of Germany since October 1915. The distance from Yambol to that part of German Fast Africa where the Schutztruppe was now fighting, allowing for detours and a margin of safety, was roughly 4375 miles. Assuming an average cruising speed of 40.6 m.p.h., the trip would take 108 hours. "LZ 120" had demonstrated that a zeppelin and its crew could endure this long a flight but that flight had been made under much more favorable circumstances particularly in regard of meteorological conditions and weather reporting. There were other serious problems such as finding Lettow - vorbeck's troops in the vastness of Africa and the danger of interception by the enemy. There was the question of how much cargo could be carried and whether these supplies, the boost to the morale of the African troops and the propaganda impact which this flight would no doubt create would be enough to justify the sacrifice of the airship. The immediate problem was the cargo. The Ministry had initially thought of a cargo of two to three tons (the figure three had been crossed out in the first evaluation) but this figure would have to be increased. Even three tons would not give the colonial troops adequate assistance, Three tons of medicine alone would be needed.

Above all, it was necessary to carry out the project quickly. Since the rainy season had come to a close at the end of May, the British had been pressing the Germans relentlessly all around their perimeter, at Tunduru in the southwest, at Iringa in the northwest corner and from Kilwa and Lindi on the Indian Ocean. The Schutztruppe was resisting stubbornly but the enemy was greatly superior in numbers and equipment. The German troops had been forced to abandon their defense lines along the Rufiji river, north of Kilwa, and were giving ground along all of the fighting fronts. How dire their straits, how short their supplies were, nobody in Berlin could say for certain but obviously time was not on its side.

The Navy Ministry set to work. It submitted a plan of a supply flight to Africa to Commander Peter Strasser, the "Führer der Luftschiffe" - the Chief of Naval Airships. A saturnine, brooding man, with heavy, dark eyebrows, a mustache and a goatee, Strasser had led the naval airship service since it was established in 1913. Then it had consisted of only a few crews in training and had no airships of its own. At its zenith, in 1917, the Airship Division numbered 19 ships and had attained an unrivaled competence in handling them. On August 24th, Strasser decided that the chances of the Africa project were "not unfavorable". That was enough for the navy. Though it still had not given final approval to the operation, the weather problem in particular needed further study, it decided that the preparation of an airship for the trip should begin immediately so as not to lose precious time once a decision was made. Lt. Commanders Sommerfeldt and Buttlar were sent to the zeppelin Works in Friedrichshafen to discuss the technical details with the factory. Sommerfeldt was the commander of airship "L 35" which was used to conduct technical experiments. Strasser relied on his technical expertise. Buttlar was the most experienced combat commander. After a detailed discussion of the technical and practical problems which could be foreseen, Sommerfeldt prepared a lengthy memorandum for the Ministry of the Navy. An airship larger than the existing types was needed to a carry sufficient cargo. There was no time to design and construct a new ship and it was decided that an airship of the type then in use be enlarged by cutting it apart and inserting an additional section, 98 feet long, housing two extra gas cells. This technique had already been successfully used on other zeppelins. If the ship were rigorously stripped of everything that was not absolutely essential to the flight, say 4,200 pounds, the total lifting capacity of the airship could be increased to 114,660 pounds, double the useful lift of the zeppelins then being built. After deducting the weight of the gasoline, oil, ballast, crew and whatever else was needed to operate the ship, the engineers estimated that a cargo of about 34,000 pounds could be allowed. In addition many useful items could be salvaged from the ship itself once it landed. The waterproof outer covering could be used to make sleeping bags, ponchos or tenting, the gas cells could be used for cotton shirts after the lining which made them gas tight had been washed off, the generator for the radio could be used again for the same purpose and the Zeppelin Company, which was asked to prepare a complete list of all salvageable items, could probably think of other things which the colonial troops could use.

Finding Lettow - Vorbeck's troops, Sommerfeldt felt, would be difficult. Berlin had only a rough idea where they were located. It thought that their headquarters were at Mahenge, a small town in the northeast corner of the German held territory. The Africa ship would have to make radio contact with the troops to coordinate its landing with them. They would have to act as a ground crew to help it land and unload it quickly.

Risk of loss by enemy action could be reduced in various ways. The Mediterranean was the most dangerous leg of the trip. It could crossed at night during a period of a new moon when the visibility of the dirigible would be reduced to a minimum. This was the standard operating procedure for German airships when opposition by enemy anti-aircraft guns or aviation was expected. In October, the moonless period would occur between the 12th and the 20th. Areas, such as Crete, where enemy aviation might be expected, could be avoided or crossed at high altitudes. The ship could fly across the desert west of the Nile to avoid its many enemy installations. East Africa did not seem like a hazardous area. It could be crossed at 12,000 feet which would make interception by the British practically impossible. Ground troops would not have incendiary ammunition or anti-aircraft guns available. There was the possibility of machine gun fire from the ground or from an airplane, which, if intense enough, could lead to such gas losses that the undertaking might fail. The same thing could happen if the zeppelin were hit by small airplane bombs even if they did not explode. What would happen if they did explode, Sommerfeldt did not think necessary to discuss nor did he waste words over the possibility of an encounter with an enemy aircraft carrying incendiary ammunition. His comment was simply: "Result: loss of ship".

On September 11th, the Ministry of the Navy sent Strasser the Sommerfeldt's report together with its own memorandum about the feasibility of the flight. The memorandum of the Ministry was more optimistic than Sommerfeldt's dry analysis. Where, for example, Sommerfeldt had noted the uncertainties in making contact with the troops in Africa, the Ministry saw no particular difficulties. It had learned from the Naval Command and the Colonial Office that several small radio stations still existed in Africa and it assumed that the ship would be able to establish contact with them with its own radio. Thus, the Ministry reported to Strasser "One of the main difficulties, 'meeting' in the large colonial areas, is therefore almost completely eliminated". Strasser, showing better sense, returned the memorandum with with a large question mark in the margin. The Ministry's memorandum concluded that a meteorological study, still to come, would decide whether the flight could be made; if no extraordinary weather conditions were encountered, the undertaking was possible. The completed weather study was to be forwarded in the next three or four days. In the meantime, would Strasser please furnish the Ministry as immediately with an opinion concerning the chances of success of the enterprise. Strasser was asked to refer to the operation by its code name "China Sache" ~ "Operation China" or the "China Affair".

The weather study which Professor Kohlschütter soon laid before the Ministry presented a mixed picture. During the first part of the trip, while the ship crossed the Mediterranean, storms could be expected in October but this was also the time of the year which was most likely to bring helping tail winds. Knowledge of weather conditions over the North African desert and further south was fragmentary. Almost nothing was known about conditions at high altitudes. Some of the information was out of date. Nevertheless, Kohlschütter expressed the opinion that conditions in Africa were sufficiently stable so that the old data could be used to form a judgement of the average weather conditions there. While he could not say how the airship would react to the broiling sun and the cold nights which it would encounter over the desert, he felt that no serious difficulties result. He said little about what might be expected in the regions beyond the desert except that on the last leg of the trip across East Africa "the variations in the rainfall from year to year were so great that a little bit of luck would be needed".

Forecasting the actual day to day conditions would be more difficult. The weather stations in Bulgaria and Asia Minor worked with only incomplete information; they lacked data from the areas to the east and the south. These were in enemy hands and the radio stations there, under war time censorship, did not broadcast much weather information. Without this, no complete weather map could be constructed for the Mediterraenean area and the North African coast. On the other hand, the German military weather service in Asia Minor could assist the ship while it was over the Mediterranean and a submarine stationed to the west of Crete could warn of storms which might approach from that direction. These weather reports would have to take the form of a report from one land weather station to another so that those radio messages would not lead anyone to suspect the presence of an airship. However, once the zeppelin was across the Mediterranean it could expect no further meteorological assistance.

Promptly on the 16th, Commander Strasser sent the Ministry his memorandum supporting the operation. With this he threw his great personal prestige behind the project. He had just been awarded Germany's highest military decoration, the "Ordre pour le Mérite". Strasser stressed the morale factor: "Completion of the operation will not only provide immediate assistance to the brave Protectorate troops but will be an event which will once more arouse the enthusiasm of the German people and admiration throughout the world". There was, of course, the danger of interception by enemy aircraft, he added, but he thought that the probility of this occuring was low as were the risks from bad weather. "With a little luck the trip should succeed" he concluded.

The next step which the Navy Ministry had to take was to obtain the concurrence of the Naval Command (Admiralstab). It had the operational control of the fleet. It was an institution equal to and independent of the Ministry of the Navy and had direct access to the throne. The Ministry of the Navy was confined to administrative and budgetary matters affecting the navy. A third, independent instutition was the Navy Cabinet. It handled the appointment, promotion and welfare of the naval officers. This unwieldy command structure was the result of Wilhelm II's endeavor to keep personal command of the navy by keeping it divided against itself. While the army was structured in a similar manner, the divisions within that part of the armed forces was bridged by the domination which the General Staff Corps exercised over all three branches of the army. The navy had no equivalent to this. The war had brought no unity to the splintered naval command structure nor had it brought a unified command to the German armed forces as a whole. The only tie between them was the person of the "Supreme Warlord", the Emperor himself.

While approval of the plan by the Naval Command was the necessary next step in carrying it out, the Ministry of the Navy did not wait for it. On September 17th, it went ahead and ordered the Zeppelin Works to rebuild "L 57", then under construction at Friedrichshafen. It felt justified in taking this procedural shortcut because the ship could always be used as a fast, seven engined reconnaissance craft over the North Sea, an idea with which Strasser completely disagreed when he learned of it.

On September 19th, the Minister of the Navy sent its proposal, classified "Streng Geheim" - Top Secret - to the Naval Command. Since the relief of the African troops admitted of no delay, it requested an answer by the 27th. It underlined the urgency of the matter with a follow-up memorandum in which the Minister pointed out that the approval of the Emperor was still required and that this should not be unnecessarily delayed.

When the Minister of the Navy forwarded the "China" plan to the Naval Command, he mentioned that he had not informed the army of the proposal. The anti-airship attitude of Messrs. Ludendorff and Thomsen was only too well known and there was no need to stir up trouble prematurely. The Colonial Office, however, immediately let the cat out of the bag. It had been searching for an "Ortskundiger", a man who knew Fast Africa and who could accompany the zeppelin to help it find its landing spot or act as an interpreter in case of a crash landing there. There were few men with a suitable background available to Berlin. The Colonial Office considered two: Professor Zupitza and army captain Richard von Bentivegni. Professor Zupitza could be available at once. As for Bentivegni, it was thought advisable to await the Emperor's approval of the operation before asking the army for him.

Then the Colonial Office changed its mind and asked the army to make the captain available without waiting for the imperial approval. Bentivegni, like Lettow-—Vorbeck and Buttlar-Brandenfels, came from one of those families which had for generations supplied officers to the German army, whose stock in trade was war. The German branch of the Bentivegni family differed a little from typical military families. It descended from a distinguished Italian family of church administrators, judges and notaries. In the 1760's, Giralomo Bentivegni had crossed the Alps and enrolled as an officer candidate in the Life Guards of Frederick the Great of Prussia. He had apparently been an able soldier, retiring from the army as a major. His male descendants largely became officers and the females married officers. There were a few exceptions, a merchant in China, for example, and Romeo, a petty officer who met with accidental death aboard a sailing ship in the Pacific in 1868, but on the whole the Bentivegnis were military men. Since 1746 there had been three colonels, four lieutenant colonels, a major and eight company grade officers, not counting two who died as cadets, one only nine years old. What was unusual about the Bentivegnis as suppliers of military personnel was that the female descendants of Girolomo outnumbered the males 40 to 27. Fredericus, whom Girolomo had named after his liege lord, undoubtedly introduced a statistical distortion into the picture. He had nine daughters and no sons, a fate which must have been well neigh insufferable for a Prussian officer of his day.¹⁴ Richard von Bentivegni had been commissioned a lieutenant in a grenadier regiment in 1906. Five years later, Bentivegni was sent to the Oriental Institute in Berlin. Arabic, Swahili and practical courses in colonial administration were taught there. After graduation, Bentivegni was assigned to the troops in German East Africa. Bentivegni, however, apparently did it hit off well there since in 1914, he was back in Germany with the 153rd Infantry, still a lieutenant. Bentivegni's exposure to Africa had been short but it probably was sufficient for the limited purpose for which he was being considered. On the other hand, it was likely that he was unfit for service in Africa. He had been wounded twice, once lightly in 1914 but more severely in 1915 when he suffered a fracture of the lower left leg and foot. This injury hospitalized him for three months. It would probably have made it difficult for him to participate in the long and rapid marches that characterized Lettow-Vorbeck's tactics in 1917. When the Colonial Office asked the army on the 20th, only one day after the Ministry had sent its plan to the Naval Command, to make Bentivegni available for the "China Affair", the Fat was in the fire again.

In July, Ludendorff had written to the Naval Command and asked it to abandon its airship service as the army had done. The commander of the High Seas Fleet, Admiral Scheer, however, rejected the suggestion. The affairs of the navy were none of Ludendorff's business. The navy reported to the Kaiser and not to Ludendorff. It was indeed one of the German instutitions over which Ludendorff held no sway.

Scheer was not just squabbling over jurisdiction. He was convinced that he needed the airship. Because of the far greater strength of the British navy, zeppelins were needed for scouting over the North Sea and protecting the German navy against surprise attack. With their great range of observation in clear weather, airships were well suited for this. Every day, weather permitting, three airships were far out at sea, flying a protective cordon which stretched from the Dutch coast north beyond the Dogger Bank to the Grand Fisher Bank and east to Norway. Airplanes still lacked the necessary range and endurance for such an assignment. The argument between Ludendorff and the navy which ensued boiled on well into August until the Kaiser struck a compromise between the quarreling services. The naval airship service would be continued, but at substantially reduced strength. This compromise was not to the liking of either party. The quarrel was still fresh in Colonel Thomsen's mind when he received the Colonial Office's request for Bentivegni.

Thomsen at once telegraphed the Colonial Office that the captain could not be made available as he was on special duty with the airforce. Bentivegni was in fact more valuable in his present position than he could be on the Africa flight. After he had recovered from his wounds in 1915, he had been trained as an aircraft observer and for the last year had commanded a heavy bombing squadron. Thomsen added to his telegram that he had already reported to Ludendorff that the proposed mission had little chance of success. The Supreme Command therefore requested to be present when the matter was presented to the Emperor for approval.

Worried that Col. Thomsen's opposition might abort the project, officers of the Colonial Office and the Ministry of the Navy went to see ene cnet of Staff of the Naval Command for advice. Commander von Knorr did not share their concern. He was sure that the Emperor would go along with the plan if it was militarily justified. As for Thomsen's telegram, he suggested that the Colonial Office write to him, after a suitable delay, and tell him that the Naval Command had been advised of Army's position and that it would be taken into consideration.

The Naval Command was favorably inclined towards the project but it was not convinced, despite Strasser's backing, that it was technically feasible. It suggested that an expert commission examine the idea again. Fifteen men convened in Berlin on the 27th of September. The officer who had been designated to command the "China" ship had been asked to participate but had telegraphed from Friedrichshafen: "Impossible to get there now. Conference possible next week after transfer [of "L 57" to glterbog]". "L 57" was in the last stages of completion and he apparently felt that he was needed at the Zeppelin works more urgently than at a conference. The committee had already postponed its meeting for one day to permit Strasser to attend but it did not wait for the captain of "L 57". When the committee met, Knorr of the Naval Command at once raised the question which must have been on the minds of many. How reliable were airship engines? Malfunctioning of zeppelin engines on long flights was a recurring problem. Knorr had heard that they could not withstand the more than hundred hours of operation required to get to Africa. Strasser answered that the expected mode of operation would be on four engines with one in reserve and that most of the defects which might be expected could be repaired during flight. One by one the worrisome points were taken up - rainfall in Africa, sufficiency of the weather data, maps and navigation, enemy planes and so on. Many of the men had already worked on the Africa plan and remained optimistic about it. Despite his support of the operation at the conference, Strasser was less enthusiastic than he had been when he had first endorsed the operation. On September 19th, the Colonial Office had sent him a copy of a despatch in the "London Times" of the 10th which reported an attack on German troops at Mponda by six airplanes of the British East African Expeditionary Force. The news had a strong impact on Strasser. The success of the whole undertaking now seemed in question; enemy airstrength in Africa appeared to be greater than he had expected. Strasser, said little about this at the conference, however.

The discussion soon turned to more practical things. The agreed upon starting point for the flight was Yambol but this army base was in the process of being dismantled now that the army's zeppelin service was disbanding. How quickly could Yambol be made operational again. There was nervousness about the Commanding General of the Army 'Airforces. Was it necessary to ask him for permission to use the base? Was not the Ministry of War responsible for such approval? Would it be better to obtain the Imperial approval first so as to foreclose any opposition to the to use the base by the navy. What about security? Of course, the troops in Africa would have to be told that the airship was coming. That seemed safe. The radio code used for traffic with the colonies was believed to be secure and not known to the enemy, but Strasser stressed the importance of secrecy. The Naval Attaches, who acted as liaison officers on naval matters to the governments allied with Germany, were to be told only of the presence of a German airship in the Balkans but not of its intended use. The Turks were to be told nothing nor were the Senussi tribes in Tripolitania who had aligned themselves with Turkey and Germany. A cover story was agreed on: the ship would be used for mine searches in the Black Sea and for attacks on Odessa.

The Naval Command approved the "China Affair" immediately after the committee concluded its deliberations. Telegrams went out to the Naval Attaches in Vienna and Sofia that an airship operation would start at the Yambol airbase after October 7th. The Naval Attache in Sofia was further instructed to obtain a ground crew of 500 men from the Bulgarian army for a period of two weeks.

On the same day, "L 57" made its first flight. The all important approval of the Emperor still had to be obtained. The presentation to His Majesty, however, could not be scheduled earlier than October 4th. That would be only eight days before the moon would turn dark, permitting "L 57" to carry out mission. On the day of the audience with the Emperor, Knorr took Thomsen aside and talked to him about the project. To be sure, the "Africa Affair" was strictly a navy operation but Knorr knew Thomsen's attitude and it could be troubleseome when Knorr presented the plan to the Kaiser. Besides, he would need the army's cooperation in running the Yambol base. Thomsen's reaction was a pleasant surprise. The colonel was "very correct", promised to keep Yambol available until the 20th and wished Knorr good luck.

Had Thomsen reconsidered and seen the possibility of a real German propaganda coup or was he giving the navy enough rope to hang itself, so that this airship business could finally be finished up? Whatever his reasons, Thomsen kept his word and raised no objections.

Commander von Knorr made his presentation. He stressed the factors which seemed to insure the safety of this unprecedented flight. "Success can be assured", he stated, "and there are no military dangers which require that this otherwise necessary undertaking not take place".

Whoever had prepared Knorr's presentation had gotten some of the facts wrong. He stated that an extra engine had been added to the ship to boost its speed by another 6.7 m.p-h.; in fact, "L 57" had the usual five engines and was slightly slower that the standard "v" type. It did not matter. For once, everyone was in agreement and the Kaiser gave his approval.

On October 6th, over the wires strung from the tall radio towers at Nauen, flowed a coded message for the Governor of German East Africa: " Beginning middle October you may expect the arrival of a naval airship, intended landing place Livale, which will carry weapons, munitions and medical supplies. Airship will try to make early contact by radio wavelength 600 meters...Airship is equipped with your signal code, will use code key number 376. Please make all possible preparations. Advise airship as early as possible by radio or optical signal of suitable landing place". Added were the code call sign of the airship and the signal by which the airship would call the local radio station.

There was a curious omission from the message. It did not tell Governor Schnee how large a cargo the airship would bring. In fact, the planned cargo would require about 560 bearers and their usual number of camp followers to transport. Tt was not a force that could be assembled at a moment's notice. How were Schnee and Lettow —- Vorbeck to prepare for unloading the ship if they did not know the size of the cargo to be carried away?